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NEGLIGENCE: BLACKSTONE TO SHAW TO ? AN
INTELLECTUAL ESCAPADE IN A TORY VEIN
E. F. Robertst
As an admiring lay observer, I have always considered that W. S.
Gilbert's Lord Chancellor, when he declared that the law is the true embodiment of everything that's excellent, stated no more than the truth.
If it has a single fault or flaw, I lay that to the unfortunate intrusion of the
human element-a fallibility and unreasonableness of mankind that enters
to disturb the law's own august order of right and reason. This, I think,
the law itself feels. In its accumulated wisdom, work of the best minds
for many centuries, the law moves-and not without resource and dexterity
-to minimize the damage men can do its processes by being men.
James Gould Cozzens'
Law review articles are more often than not precise dissertations about
observable phenomena-to wit, statutes, cases and the like, to which are
appended evaluations of the social significance of such phenomena.
Caveat emptor, this piece seeks to evoke a mood, a feeling for the situation, which broods over the American scene. This is the notion that law is
social engineering. Exaggerating somewhat the influence of this idea in
every day practice, I have attempted to evoke an image of how this very
idea has undermined traditional legal folk-ways and presages a new epoch
in American law. Throughout I have used, or perhaps abused, the English
for counterpoint. Looked at as an intellectual escapade, a search for the
subliminal as well as the articulate, it may afford irritation enough to
catalyze the reader into formulating his own judgment on the matter.
I

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ORDER
Students of the law of torts are well aware that the specific tort of
negligence is a relatively recent development. Indeed, in modern times, at
least one English authority questioned the very existence of negligence as
a particular tort.2 Be that as it may, we do tend to divide torts into two
large divisions, namely, intentional and unintentional torts. Under the
first category we tend to think of assault, battery, and false imprisonment
while, in the second, negligence looms large. Still, we vaguely recall that
around 1800 no such way of looking at the law of torts existed; the forms
t A.B. 1952, Northeastern University; LL.B. 1954, Boston College. Professor of Law,
Cornell University.
1 Cozzens, Notes on a Difficulty of Law by One Unlearned in It, 1 Bucks County L. Rptr.

302 (1952).

2 Salmond, Jurisprudence § 5 (6th ed. 1920). Compare Salmond, Torts 405 (13th ed.
1961); Winfield, Torts 167-68 (7th ed. 1963).
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of action still prevailed and torts were divided upon the basis of two
remedies, either trespass or case. Further, we may even recall that, while
trespass more or less involved assault, battery, and false imprisonment,
and negligence fell under the action on the case, nonetheless, trespass was
broad enough to include injuries which were neither intentionally nor
negligently inflicted. In short, trespass entailed, if only peripherally, a
taint of liability without fault.
This particular notion of liability without fault was eradicated from
American law in 1850 when Chief Justice Shaw enunciated the leading
opinion in Brown v. Kendall.3 It was not formally erased from English
jurisprudence until 1959, if it be erased at all, by a nisi prius opinion in
Queen's Bench.4 This lag of more than a century gives rise to the query,
Why? Why should England follow the American lead a century later?
More particularly, why should England follow the American lead at a
time when American courts are said to be emasculating the principles of
traditional negligence law and themselves meandering toward a kind of
liability without fault.- Thereby hangs a tale. In order to appreciate the
comparative evolution of the concept "negligence" on either side of the
Atlantic, however, it will be necessary to return to what one favorite
children's television serial so nicely calls "those days of yesteryear." In
our case, yesteryear marks the end of the eighteenth and the dawn of the
nineteenth century.
Conventional wisdom has long insisted that "trespass vi et armis" was
a particular remedy for harms inflicted upon a victim by the direct application of force, particularly wrongs such as assault, battery, and false
imprisonment. Further, it has generally been accepted that "trespass on
the case" was developed to remedy wrongs perpetrated without the direct
application of force. 6 This conventional wisdom can easily be illustrated
by recourse to an opinion of Lord Kenyon in 1794. The immediate case
involved a highway collision between two horse drawn vehicles caused,
according to plaintiff, because defendant "then and there so furiously,
negligently and improperly drove the said cart and horse."' 7 The problem
3

60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).

4 Fowler v. Lanning, [1959] 1 Q.B. 426. See Letang v. Cooper, [1964] 3 Weekly L.R.

573 (CA.).
5 E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963). See also Restatement (Second), Torts §§ 519-20 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
6 E.g., Prosser, Torts 37 (1941): "Trespass was the remedy for all forcible, direct injuries, whether to the person or property. Trespass on the case . . .developed as a supplement . . .designed to afford a remedy for obvious wrongful conduct resulting in injuries
which were not forcible or not direct." Salmond, Torts 5 (13th ed. 1961): "Trespass . . .
was the remedy for all forcible and direct injuries .... Case, on the other hand, provided
for all injuries not amounting to trespasses-that is to say, for all injuries which were
either not forcible or not direct, but merely consequential."
7 Day v. Edwards, 5 T.R. 648, 649, 101 Eng. Rep. 361, 362 (K.B.'-1794).
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of law-arose because plaintiff had elected to proceed on a theory of trespass on the case and defendant had countered by demurring, insisting that
the harm having been immediate, case was inappropriate. Lord Kenyon
sustained the demurrer and, almost as if sad to see counsel still falling
into error on the point, purported to succinctly state the appropriate law.
The distinction between the actions of trespass vi et armis and on the
case is perfectly clear. If the injury be committed by the immediate act
complained of, the action must be trespass; if the injury be merely consequential upon the act, an action upon the case is the proper remedy. 8
And in insisting upon the clear-cut distinction, as he did in Day v. Edwards, Lord Kenyon was heeding the earlier policy pronouncement of
Lord Raymond that, "We must keep up the boundaries of actions, other9
wise we shall introduce the utmost confusion."
Blackstone, in his capacity as judge, had already agreed with the pronouncement of Lord Raymond, citing it as very just. Blackstone also
thought that there existed a "settled distinction" between the two forms
of action, and, like Lord Kenyon, he believed that "where the injury is
immediate, an action of trespass will lie; where it is only consequential, it
must be an action on the case." 10 In fact, a number of judges during the
last half of the eighteenth century had come to believe that this was the
distinction between the two forms of action. In Scott v. Shepherd, for
example, while disagreeing with Blackstone as to the application of the
rule, Chief Judge De Grey agreed that the "question is, whether the injury is the direct and immediate act of the defendant .

. .

."

Wide-

spread currency, moreover, was given to Judge Fortescue's dictum that
"if a man throws a log into the highway, and in that act hits me, I may
maintain trespass, because it is an immediate wrong; but if as it lies there
I tumble over it, and receive an injury, I must bring an action upon the
case ....

,,12

It may very well be, however, that time has distorted the images thus
reflected down through several score of years. I say this because other
arguments, other methods of classifying the decided cases then on hand,
can be found in the contemporary reports. Scott v. Sheplzerd,la for example, involved a defendant who had thrown a primitive hand-grenade into
a marketplace where it landed on the stall of a gingerbread man, who, it
is said, instinctively threw it away from himself, so that it landed on the
8 Ibid.
9 Reynolds v. Clark, 1 Str. 634, 635, 93 Eng. Rep. 747, 748 (K.B. 1726).
10 Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Black. W. 892, 894, 96 Eng. Rep. 525, 526 (C.P. 1773). See
also 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 123 (1900).
11 Scott v. Shepherd, supra note 10, at 899, 96 Eng. Rep. at 528.
12 Reynolds v. Clark, supra note 9, at 636, 93 Eng. Rep. at 748.
13 Scott v. Shepherd, supra note 10.
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stall of another gingerbread man, who again reacted instinctively and
threw it away, until, in its awkward trajectory, the infernal device exploded in the plaintiff's face. Plaintiff sued the defendant in trespass but
the question arose whether the injury was in fact direct, since, after the
missile left the defendant's hand, new force and direction was applied to
it by the intermediate actors. Both Blackstone and De Grey insisted that
the distinction between trespass and case was whether the force was
direct or not; still they disagreed in the application of this principle to the
case at hand. Blackstone thought that plaintiff should have instituted an
action on the case, reasoning that the missile injured plaintiff only as a
consequence of the actions of the intermediate actors. De Grey, however,
believing the middle men to have acted instinctively, could not see how
they added anything to the equation: it was as if the grenade had bounced
off several walls before it exploded in plaintiff's face.
Thus it was that one judge saw the harm as a mere consequence and the
other as a direct result of the defendant's act. If this were all there was to
it, one could fairly say that the debate between the two of them had an
aroma of logic-chopping about it. The fact of the matter is, however, that,
while disagreeing among themselves as to the application of their principle, both Blackstone and De Grey were asserting the validity of their
principle in a simultaneous debate with yet another member of the bench
who was putting forth a different idea altogether. Judge Nares was of the
opinion that trespass would lie here, but in his mind it made no difference whether the harm had been direct or consequential. If the original
act had been "unlawful" trespass would lie in any event. In fact, said
Judge Nares "The principle I go upon is what is laid down in Reynolds
and Clark, Stra. 634, that if the act in the first instance be unlawful, trespass will lie."1

4

To which Blackstone had several arguments by way of

rebuttal.
First, Blackstone undermined the authority cited by his colleague, observing that "something of that sort was put into Lord Raymond's mouth
in Stra. 635."' 5 Indeed Blackstone had a point here because, while
Strange's report does carry the quotation, Lord Raymond's reports do
not. 6 Then, having questioned the authority for the proposition, Blackstone proceeded to illustrate that it did not adequately sum up the decided
cases. If, for example, it was "unlawful" to throw a log into the road and
hit someone with it, it was equally "unlawful" to throw it into the road and
later have someone fall over it. Yet in the first instance it was agreed that
14 Id. at 893, 96 Eng. Rep. at 526.
15 Id. at 894, 96 Eng. Rep. at 526.

16 Compare 2 Ld. Raym. 1399, 92 Eng. Rep. 410 (K.E. 1726), with Fort. 212, 92 Eng.
Rep. 822 (K.B. 1726).
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trespass lay while in the second, case: it was not the unlawfulness of the
act, therefore, that explained the difference, but the directness of the harm
that ensued from the act. Again, it was unlawful to falsely imprison someone; yet, if he suffered consequential damages, such as the forfeiture of a
recognizance, the victim might maintain case for these special damages."
Taking into account all of the cases, therefore, the only consistent distinction was that between direct and consequential harm.
This idea was not new with Blackstone when he came to decide Scott v.
Shepherd: rather, he was expressing something that Blackstone the scholar
had already put forth in his lectures on the Common Law.'" Had Judge
Nares seen fit, it might have been interesting had he examined some of the
authority dredged up by Blackstone to support his thesis. Had Judge
Nares done so, he would have found that Blackstone had relied on two
cases. The first of these, Bourden v. Alloway, 9 was an action of false
imprisonment brought on a theory of case instead of the usual action of
trespass. It did, therefore, involve the precise problem, what was the distinction between trespass and case? Nonetheless, in end result the case
seems to stand for the proposition that, as far as the Common Pleas bench
was concerned in the eighteenth century, it didn't really make much difference. Indeed, turning to the Reprints, one can still find a classic headnote affixed atop the statement of this case: "Quaere; whether an action
on the case, or trespass vi et armis, must lie for causing a person to be
arrested and carried to prison without cause.""
The case is even more revealing than this, however, because it seems to
indicate that the judges were not particularly interested in arresting a
judgment because of a mistake in selecting between the two forms of
action. Further, it would seem that the bench felt that either theory might
be used if the pleader selected his words carefully. Thus we find a certain
Mr. Bains saying that "he had heard from this Court, that there is but
little difference between the one and the other; and that almost all trespasses might be turned into actions on the case at the plaintiff's election."'" In fact, in this action, plaintiff alleged some special damages,
which, in the minds of the bench, allowed plaintiff to proceed in case,
despite counsel's objection that where the damage was immediate the
existence of some special or consequential damages would not convert the
action to case. The upshot of all this is, interestingly enough, that the case
hardly supports Blackstone's iron-bound dichotomy. Indeed, he apparently
17 Bourden v. Alloway, 11 Mod. 180, 88 Eng. Rep. 975 (K.B. 1709).
1s 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 123 (1900).
19 Bourdon v. Alloway, supra note 17.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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cited it, not for the result, but for that part of Mr. Bain's speech in which
that learned advocate suggested that "the true difference is this: trespass
is . . . an immediate injury; case, where the injury is collateral ....

,,2

Blackstone's second authority turns out to have been Reynolds v.
Clark,2" which he said established the line between the two forms of action. Yet this is the very case upon which Judge Nares relied to establish
that the real question is whether the act was lawful or unlawful, and if
unlawful, then trespass would lie even if the harm was merely consequential. Whereupon we find issue joined over something we ought to be
able to investigate and, perchance, by reading Reynolds v. Clark for
ourselves, resolve with whom the better argument lay. This, however, may
soon turn out to be a futile endeavor. The reasons for this remain to be
seen.
Reynolds involved nothing more than a neighborhood row which
started when defendant entered plaintiff's land, tinkered with a spout
which was part of the drainage system, the upshot of which was that when
it did rain the water ran under plaintiff's house and began to undermine it.
Plaintiff sued defendant in trespass but it turned out that defendant had a
right to enter plaintiff's land to look after the drains. Plaintiff persisted,
however, in the theory that it was still trespass. It appears that the court
was unanimous in holding that the wrong was actionable only in case. The
damage did not occur at the entry, since this was not trespass upon the
land, nor did it occur when defendant tinkered since in itself nothing
detrimental immediately happened. It was not until it rained and the
water started to flow under the house that anything untoward developed,
this as a consequence of defendant's ineptitude. It would thus appear that
Blackstone was on solid ground in saying that the case was authority for
the proposition that the distinction between trespass and case did revolve
around the relative directness of the resultant harm.
But what of the alleged statement by Raymond that had the act been
unlawful defendant would have been liable in trespass? True enough in
this sense: had plaintiff been a trespasser to begin with, he would have
been liable for the entry itself and for all of the harm that resulted therefrom, whether it was direct or consequential.2 4 But then this would have
been an "intentional tort." Paradoxically, trespass would then lie properly
22
23

Ibid.

1 Str. 634, 93 Eng. Rep. 747 (K.B. 1726).
24 Restatement (Second), Torts § 162 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958):
The rule stated in this Section carries the liability of the trespasser to greater length
in terms of what is commonly called "proximate cause," or "legal cause," than the
rules usually applied to one who is not a trespasser on land.. . . The explanation is in
part historical, and due to the persistence until quite recent years of the older rule
of strict liability for all trespass to land and its consequences.

1965]

NEGLIGENCE

in Bourden v. Alloway, since, for an intentional tort, defendant would have
been liable for the direct harm, the actual imprisonment, and the special
harm, such as the forfeiture of the recognizance.2 5 That is, there is an inchoate concept here, not quite explicit, that makes rational both views
and renders them compatible. It was not necessary, therefore, for Blackstone to dismiss Lord Raymond's dictum as never having really been
said: it could have been placed in context. But, and this is the key, it
would have been necessary to draw a distinction between intentional
torts and negligent torts and this way of categorizing things was as yet
unknown. The trouble was that the structure or method of order, using
simply the dichotomy direct versus consequential, was not adequate to
handle the several different problems involved.
Concomitantly, a counter-strain, present in Bourden v. Alloway, already portended more trouble. This is so because if our suggested rationalization is right, that case was wrongly decided. Being an intentional
tort, plaintiff could properly have used trespass and have collected for
both the direct and consequential damages. This would be the real application of Raymond's concept that if the act be unlawful then trespass lies
for all of the resultant harm. But in Bourden it may not have been in
plaintiff's own interest to rely on trespass if the damages were relatively
slight. This was so because full costs were awarded only if the damages
came to more than 40s2" in a trespass suit, whereas they were awarded
to any successful suitor in actions on the case no matter how small the
verdict. Added to the conceptual confusion, therefore, there was a practical incentive on the part of counsel to throw actions into the case category by hook or by crook.27 All of which meant that new ways of looking
at torts would have to be developed before this confusion could be
cleared up.
In addition, if our rationalization be correct, the whole debate between Blackstone and De Grey in Scott v. Shepherd itself was wasted
effort: it did not matter whether the harm was the direct result or not.
Childs v. Lewis, 40 T.L.R. 870 (K.B. 1924).
Pitts v. Ganice, 1 Sailk 10, 11, 91 Eng. Rep. 10, 11 (K.B. 1689): "When plaintiff had
an election to bring either trespass or case, the latter is preferable, as the statute . . . does
not in that action prevent the recovery of the full costs if the damages are under 40s."
Accord, Savignac v. Roome, 6 T.R. 125, 129-30, 101 Eng. Rep. 470, 472-73 (K.B. 1794).
27 The reader should be aware that costs in England are a different matter than in
America.
Costs include all those expenses of litigation which one party has to pay the other.
They must be carefully distinguished from "fees" which have to be paid by a litigant
to the officers of the court . . . . In England a litigant rarely brings or defends an
action without realizing that costs are a major consideration and that they may greatly
exceed the actual sum in dispute.
Goodhart, "Costs," 38 Yale L.J. 849, 849-50 (1929), reprinted in Goodhart, Essays in
Jurisprudence and the Common Law ch. X (1931).
25
26

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. -s

Further, Judge Nares was quite correct when he said that the act being
unlawful, the actor was liable for both the direct and consequential results, if by unlawful Nares meant that the actor had perpetrated an intentional tort. But this kind of thinking simply was not in vogue. Granted
then the contemporary premises, it would appear in the light of Reynolds
v. Clark, that Blackstone was right, in so far as anyone could be "right"
in imposing some kind of rational order on the various discordant opinions
then available.
It ought to be remembered, moreover, that Blackstone was the first
man since Bracton to have undertaken to write a treatise on the whole law
of England. More importantly the treatise was the culmination of his
lectures at Oxford which were the first modern effort to reduce the Common Law to something that could be taught through a study of underlying
principles. Holdsworth has noted that "Two words describe the leading
characteristics of Blackstone's mind-order and system."2 It was system
he introduced into the study of the common law by imposing order on the
disparate cases and thereby "he summed up and passed on to future
generations of lawyers . . . both the principles of the many disparate
parts of which the English legal system had come to consist, and of the
relations of these parts to one another."2 9
II
Tim MODIFICATION OF ORDER
Blackstone's was a triumph of logic: he managed to come up with a
system of order which appeared adequately to explain the decided cases.
Indeed, it would appear that the secret to his success was his ability to
state a relatively simple rule which explained these cases, a rule which
then came to be believed because it did appear to explain disparate cases
and thereby did create order out of chaos. Once established, of course, the
existence of order then hinged on the continued belief in the rule itself;
until some more satisfactory explanation was forthcoming order and belief were synonymous. If this be true, therefore, we should expect to find
almost fanatical devotion to the rule, even when it did not work, until
such a time as a new set of mental constructs was developed to replace it
with a new order. Let us return to the cases and see whether this was
the situation.
28 12 Holdsworth, History of English Law 718 (1938).
29 Id. at 702. See also Hanbury, The Vinerian Chair and Legal Education (1958): "The
insistence on the fundamental distinction between the actions of trespass and case, enunciated by Blackstone the professor, was . . . reiterated by Blackstone the judge." Id. at 33.
"In Scott v. Shepherd he had an opportunity to translate his academic instruction into
practical reality . . . . The majority of later jurists would probably prefer errare cum
platone." Id. at 49.
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In 1799, just four years after his precise dissertation in Day v. Edwards, Lord Kenyon was presented with the intriguing case of Ogle v.
Barnes.30 Defendants had mismanaged their vessel and it had collided
with plaintiff's ship. Plaintiffs had sued and had obtained a verdict at
trial. The action, however, had been one on the case and defendants
moved in arrest of judgment: after all, the harm had been direct, Day
was controlling, and the law was quite clear. Faced with what appeared
to be a hopeless situation, Erskine spoke against the motion, rendering
articulate a whole new approach to the subject. Apparently having reflected on the import of the lawful-unlawful dichotomy, he reasoned that
there were two lines of cases involved: wilful torts and negligent torts.
Further, he argued, while trespass was the proper remedy for wilful torts,
case lay for negligence. On the authorities, however, it would appear that
the plaintiffs had the better of the argument. What had wilfulness to do
with it? Did not trespass lie for direct harm whether the act was wilful or
negligent? Indeed, was it not self-evident that "if A. in attempting to
strike B. by accident strike C., C. may maintain trespass, because the
injury is immediate."81
Ogle led to two surprises. First, of course, was the very modern dichotomy which Erskine used when pressed to the wall. The second one was
even better: Lord Kenyon found in Erskine's favor but maintained his
own principles in the process! This he did by distinguishing Day v. Edwards, which, after all, involved bad driving, a positive act, whereas the
instant case involved the failure to steer the vessel, an omission. Lord
Kenyon may have been satisfied that he had stood fast for principle but
the result of the case can only have undermined the precise dichotomy so
recently established.
King's Bench in 1803 sought to reimpose Blackstone's order in Leame v.
Bray,3" another vehicular accident case in which plaintiff had been nonsuited after proceeding in trespass. Removing the nonsuit which he himself had granted at trial, Lord Ellenborough attempted to quash Erskine's
heresy once and for all:
The true criterion seems to be, according to what Lord C. J. de Grey says
in Scott v. Shepherd, whether plaintiff received an injury by force from the
defendant .... It is immaterial whether the injury be wilful or not.33
Following on the footsteps of Day v. Edwards, this would seem to have
been sufficient to restore order.
Within three years rumblings of discord were abroad again. Sir James
8 T.R. 188, 101
81 Ogle v. Barnes,
32 3 East 593, 102
33 Learae v. Bray,
S3

Eng. Rep. 1338 (K.B. 1799).
supra note 30, at 190, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1339.
Eng. Rep. 724 (K.B. 1803).
supra note 32, at 599, 102 Eng. Rep. at 726.
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Mansfield, Chief Justice of Common Pleas, opened the door again by a
well placed dictum. In still another vehicular accident case, plaintiff
initiated an action on the case but was met by a demurrer. The court
took the unusual step of warning defendant that it was of a mind to overrule it, suggested that he plead over, and, it is interesting to note, counsel
heeded the advice. Still, Sir James warned counsel that they should not
think that this action overruled Leame v. Bray although "upon a proper
case . . .it should be reconsidered." 3 4 Not to be outdone, Lord Ellen-

borough of the King's Bench thereupon let fly at nisi prius the suggestion
that it might be "worthy of consideration, whether . . . the party may

not waive the trespass and proceed for the tort?" 3
It would appear that it was now generally recognized that there were
two kinds of torts, intentional and inadvertent, and, moreover, that the
direct-consequential rule did not adequately afford a system of order. Still,
the strong language of Blackstone, De Grey, and Kenyon appeared to be
good law and, granting the concept of stare decisis, this proved to be a
stumbling block on the path to any sweeping structural reorganization.
We find, instead, that subterfuge became the order of the day; witness
cases such as that handled by Sir James. Indeed, if one likes dates, it
would appear that in 1825 subterfuge was officially approved, so that
after 1825 negligence cases could be prosecuted on the case whether the
harm was direct or consequential. It was in 1825, after all, that Judge
Holroyd allowed himself to say that, "In cases where there is no ground
of action, except the trespass, perhaps case will not lie; but where actual
damage has been sustained, the trespass may be waived, and an action is
maintainable on the special circumstances of the case."36
After 1825 the waters become muddy indeed: Kenyon's iron rule is the
law in the books but in practice case lies for negligence even where the
harm is direct. Order having dissolved, it was only a matter of time until
some new device should be created to re-institute some kind of order. This
Rogers v. Imbleton, 2 Bos. & Pul. N.R. 117, 119, 127 Eng. Rep. 568, 569 (C.P. 1806).
35 Hall v. Pickard, 3 Camp. 187, 170 Eng. Rep. 1350 (K.B. 1812).
36 Moreton v. Hardern, 4 Barn. & Cres. 223, 228, 107 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1044 (K.B. 1825).
Moreton involved an action on the case against the three proprietors of a coach line
after their servant had run down plaintiff with a team and coach. At trial, however, it
developed that one of the three proprietors was driving the rig at the time. As to the
driver-proprietor, trespass lay, and, argued defendant, trespass was the remedy against all
three. The court seemed to think that while trespass did lie against the one, the other two
were liable in case. This, however, would have required two actions since trespass and case
could not be joined in one action at that time. Thus as a practical matter, allowing the
use of case against all three made a great deal of sense. Further the case might easily have
been limited to its peculiar facts: needless to say, it was not. Indeed, some authorities
select 1825 as the birth date of negligence as a distinct action evolving out of the morass
of trespass and case. E.g., Winfield, Torts 167 (7th ed. 1963). See also Winfield & Goodhart,
"Trespass and Negligence," 49 L.Q. Rev. 359 (1933): "But Williams v. Holland (1833)
laid down emphatically a rule that had really been indicated in Moreton v. Hardern."
34
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was done in Williams v. Holland,37 when, after a vehicular collision, a
plaintiff threw caution to the winds and, despite Day and Leame, adopted
case as a vehicle for recovery. Defendant's motion for nonsuit was overruled and, explicitly, now, plaintiffs were told that in negligence cases they
should henceforth have the election either to cite the impact and sue in
trespass or cite the alleged negligence of the defendant and the consequential damages wrought thereby and proceed in case. Lip-service was paid to
stare decisis, however, because neither Day nor Leame was overruled.
Instead, Day was distinguished on the ground that it involved an intentional tort, since defendant there had driven "furiously" as well as negligently; while Leame was limited to its precise issue, since after all it only
established that trespass lay and said not a word about case.
Williams, interestingly enough, superimposed a new order upon an old
one: it did not purport to wipe the slate clean of old learning. Indeed,
after Williams the structure of the tort process was a four-fold division, a
combination of two categories with divisions thereof running across one
another. Thus, it was established that only trespass lay for intentional
and direct harm.33 For intentional but indirect harm case was appropriate.39 Prior to Williams, trespass lay for direct inadvertent harm and
case for indirect inadvertent harm, but now plaintiff had the option always
to proceed in case for inadvertent harm.40
III
OPDER RECONSTITUTED

Thus far we have assumed that English and American tort law were
pretty much parallel in their development. Indeed, up through 1833 they
were; in fact, Williams v. Holland had been anticipated by an American
opinion. 41 In 1850, however, the two systems split asunder after Chief
Justice Shaw's leading opinion in Brown v. Kendall.42 There it will be
recalled, defendant had tried to separate a pair of battling dogs and, in
37 10 Bing. 112, 131 Eng. Rep. 848 (C.P. 1833). See also M. J. Prichard, "Trespass, Case
and the Rule in Williams v. Holland," [1964] Camb. L.J. 234. This article appeared while
the current one was going to print and for those interested in the origins of Williams,
presents an interesting analysis of the early cases.
38 Savignac v. Roome, 6 T.R. 125, 101 Eng. Rep. 470 (K.B. 1794); Day v. Edwards, 5
T.R. 648, 101 Eng. Rep. 361 (K.B. 1794); Weeton v. Woodcock, 5 M. & W. 586, 151
Eng. Rep. 248 (Ex. 1839). Accord, Kelly v. Lett, 13 Nedell Law 50 (N.C. 1851). See Fleming,
Torts 18 n.14 (2d ed. 1961) ; Winfield & Goodhart, supra note 36, at 366.
39 E.g., Adams v. Hemmenway, 1 Mass. 145 (1804). There defendant intentionally shot
plaintiff-owner's ship captain, ndcessitating a return to port so that the profits of the
voyage were lost. Vis-i-vis .the wounded ship's master it was a trespass; as to the plaintiffowner, whose interest was economic, the harm, while deliberately inflicted, was only
consequential.
40 The change can be illustrated. See M. J. Prichard, supra note 37, at 251.
41 Dalton v. Favour, 3 N.H. 465 (1826).
42 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); Restatement, Torts § 18 (1934).
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order to do so, raised his cane over his shoulder preparatory to striking a
mighty blow for peace. Instead of swatting the, dogs, however, defendant
only succeeded in striking plaintiff, who, it appears, was standing behind
him. Plaintiff sued in trespass, citing the bare facts and omitting to charge
defendant with either intent or negligence. The trial judge instructed the
jury that defendant was liable for the trespass notwithstanding the absence of intent unless he had persuaded them that he had exercised such
extraordinary care that the incident could be considered an "inevitable
accident." The jury were not persuaded, judgment was entered for plaintiff, but a new trial was ordered upon appeal.
In substance, Chief Judge Shaw, declared that plaintiff had either to
plead intent, i.e., battery, or negligence: in either case, it was incumbent
upon him to prove it. Leame v. Bray was repudiated: that case, after all,
had held that trespass lay for the direct infliction of harm and that it was
-'immaterial" whether the injury was wilful or not. Still, Shaw was hardly
bound by a case decided after Independence. Thus, torts was divided into
two broad categories, intentional torts and negligence, in which form they
have evolved in America down to the present day.
Americans thereafter tended to drop "trespass" and to think in terms
of assault, battery, and false imprisonment on the intentional side of the
ledger and in terms of negligence on the other side. In England, however,
trespass still existed in no man's land, Leame v. Bray not having been
overruled. Its very existence contributed to several differences in thinking between England and America which have continued until our day.
Thus, the approach to battery differs, as does the problem of strict liability versus negligence.
To illustrate differences in thinking about battery, let us suppose two
hypothetical situations: first, D-1 forcibly pours poison down P-l's throat
and, second, D-2 slips poison into P-2's tea and P-2 subsequently cons.imes the tea. In America, both D-1 and D-2 have committed batteries:
both have intentionally inflicted harm upon their respective victims. 8 An
Englishman would agree that the first incident was a battery. 4 To him,
however, the second would not constitute a battery since, after all, the
wrongdoer did not touch the victim and directly introduce the poison into
his system: rather, it was accomplished by guile and even then the harm
arose only as a consequence of the victim actually drinking the poisoned
tea.45 Thus, whereas the American associates battery with intent and is
impatient with hairsplitting over whether the harm is direct or not, the
43 Comnrionwealth v. Stratton, 114 Mass. 303 (1873).
44 McDonald v. Associated Fuels, Ltd., [19541 3 D.L.R. 775 (B.C.S. Ct.).
45 E.g., Street, Torts 19 nn.3, 5 (3d ed. 1963); Winfield, Torts 151 n.37, 163-64 (7th ed.
1963).
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Englishman still thinks in terms of battery as a form of trespass, involving both intent and direct harm. Fundamental differences in conceptual
outlooks, therefore, inevitably lead to differences in practical result in
their application to the second hypothetical situation.
In the area of negligence proper, Leame v. Bray created still another
problem: granted a case similar to Brown v. Kendall, for example, why
couldn't plaintiff proceed in trespass and collect without proving either
intent or negligence upon defendant's part. Carried to its logical conclusion, of course, this would entail making defendant liable without fault.
It would appear, however, that no one really carried things quite that far.
Witness the trial judge in Brown v. Kendall itself who was willing to
exonerate the defendant if he could prove "inevitable accident." And, this
was precisely how English law treated the problem, "inevitable accident"
coming to mean that defendant could escape liability by undertaking to
prove the exercise of due care 6 In substance, therefore, the only real
difference between trespass and negligence was the allocation of the
burden of proving due care.
Peculiarly enough, highway accident cases, the precise descendents
of Leame v. Bray, were treated differently. In these cases, a la Brown v.
Kendall, injured plaintiffs had either to sue for negligence or, if they
elected trespass, to prove not only the direct impact but negligence as
well. This came as a result of Holmes v. Mather4 7 in 1875, a decision
clouded in considerable mystery. Indeed, it was probably "bad law" in
the sense that there were no precedents for creating such exceptional
8
treatment for highway cases
It was not until 1959 when all of this came to a head with the recent
decision by Judge Diplock in Fowler v. Lanning.49 There a victim of a
shooting accident initiated an action of trespass, carefully omitting to
allege intent or negligence. It appears certain that there was no question
of intent but that plaintiff simply wanted to put the onus of proving due
care upon the defendant. In this he failed because Judge Diplock, after
reviewing a considerable body of precedent, cited the highway cases and
then concluded that, rather than the exception, they were the rule. In
short, more than a century later, England adopted the rule enunciated by
Chief Judge Shaw in Brown v. Kendall. Henceforth, or so it would appear,
46 Stanley v. Powell, [1891] 1 Q.B. 86. For a collection of authorities, see Winfield,
supra note 45, at 146 n.14.
47 L.R. 10 Ex. 261 (1875).
48 Winfield & Goodhart, supra note 36, at 378; Winfield, supra note 45, at 147.
49 [19591 2 Weekly L.R. 241 (Q.B.). See also Letang v. Cooper, [1964] 3 Weekly L.R.

573, 577 (CA.) (Lord Denning): "When the injury is not inflicted intentionally but negligently, I would say that the only cause of action is negligence and not trespass."
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torts in England fall under the broad heads of intent and negligence, and
perforce, the action of trespass and its hint of strict liability for the
direct infliction of harm has been put to rest at last.
IV
ORDER ITSELF INVESTIGATED

Why, it should occur to the reader, should 1850 Massachusetts have
put things flatfooted into either the intentional or negligent tort camps
and be done with it? In a recent law review article, Professor Gregory has
come up with an answer: because, he says, American judges in the midnineteenth century "disliked the imposition of liability without fault and
reacted against any manifestation of this notion."5 ° But why did American judges dislike liability without fault? Because, responds Gregory,
"many of our judges believed that the development of this young country
under a system of private enterprise would be hindered and delayed as
long as the element of chance exposed enterprisers to liability for the consequences of pure accident, without fault of some sort."'"
The difficulty with this explanation is, first of all, that it assumes that
the defendant who accidentally dropped a plank from a scaffolding was
liable even if he had exercised due care. The fact of the matter is that
even in Brown v. Kendall the trial judge instructed the jury that defendant could exonerate himself by proving inevitable accident. Indeed, it now
seems quite possible that the lawyers of the day did not really believe
in strict liability." In fact, Brown v. Kendall did not remove strict liability from the law: it was not then there. What Chief Judge Shaw actually
did was to re-allocate the onus of proof of negligence so that, as a practical matter, trespass for negligent harm ceased to have any significance.
Brown was not, therefore, a total revolution: rather it tidied up the law of
torts, removing the eccentric allocation of the burden of proving due care.
If, perforce, Gregory may have overstated the change, the problem of
"why" remains re the change that was made. Gregory, of course, suggests that Chief Judge Shaw was activated, as a good social engineer, by
50 Gregory, "Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability," 37 Va. L. Rev. 359, 365
(1951).
51 Ibid.
52 We shall soon see that lawyers and law professors are apt to have very different views
about this. See note 102 infra. Holmes, of course, did not accept the view that trespass
meant strict liability for negligent infliction of direct harm. And see Diplock, J., in
Fowler v. Lanning, [19591 2 Weekly L.R. 241, 244 (Q.B.): "But however true this may
have been of trespass in medieval times-and I respectfully doubt whether it ever wasthe strict principle that every man acts at his peril was not applied in the case of trespass
to the person even as long ago as 1617." This reflects the work, perhaps, of Winfield, "The
Myth of Absolute Liability," 42 L.Q. Rev. 37 (1926); see Wigmore, "Responsibility for
Tortious Acts: Its History-III," 7 Harv. L. Rev. 441, 443 (1894). See also the same
article expanded in reprint, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 505 n.5 (1909)
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an urge to aid "free enterprise." This makes his solution sound close to a
conscious tilting of the scales; a change perpetrated explicitly to aid the
business community. This action, done today, would have a certain color
of bias attached to it. But, done as it was in 1850, indeed, done before the
words "free enterprise" had even entered the vocabulary, 53 was it quite
so bold? That is, in Chief Judge Shaw's own time, set in his own cultural milieu could not the change have been inspired by a somewhat
broader perspective? Brown itself, after all, did not involve industry; it
involved private persons and a dog fight. Rather than simply promoting
"General Motors," is it not more accurate to say that Chief Judge Shaw
saw the change in moral terms as well, as a sound policy not only for
business but for every man? Taken at its own face value in its own
period, was not the rule almost inevitable?
Holmes also addressed himself to Brown v. Kendall. He noted, however,
that the rule prior to Brown was inconsistent in a sense. That is, where a
private person dropping a plank might be liable in trespass if it hit a
passerby, a master was liable only if his servant had been negligent in
dropping the plank."4 To remove this difference in treatment a choice had
to be made between making both liable either in trespass or for negligence.
Positing the question in this "either/or" posture, Holmes had no trouble
coming down on the side of negligence. It was clear to him that the law
had outgrown strict liability, if indeed it had ever existed, and a man was
currently responsible only for harm he either intentionally or negligently
inflicted.
In order to find a rationale for this result, Holmes addressed himself to
the plight of the victim of a pure accident who now was left without a
remedy. In Holmes' mind there was a "general principle of our law . . .
that loss from accident must lie where it falls . . "I This was true
because accidents are bound to occur in any active society: but action
ought to be encouraged, and certainly not discouraged by imposing upon
the actor the burden of compensating the victims of accidents. After all,
"the public generally profits by individual activity."5 " The law, therefore,
should not get involved in the accident arena-there was nothing good to
be accomplished there. "State interference," of course, "is an evil, where
it cannot be shown to be a good."5 7 In short, Holmes saw the evolution of
58
tort law as a reflection of laissez-faire policy.
53 The word did not appear in Webster, New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934); it
is now in the third edition. Webster, New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1961).
54 Holmes, The Common Law 77-82, 88-96 (1881).
65 Id. at 94.
56 Id. at 95.
57

Id. at 96.

58 E.g., Bentham's dictum: "The

Motto, or Watchwords of government on these
occasions, ought to-Be Quiet." Bentham, Manual of Political Economy ch. I. (1865).
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To Gregory, therefore, the substance of change was clear: negligence
aided free enterprise and free enterprise was the "good" of the era. To
Holmes, however, negligence meshed quite nicely with all of the basic
presuppositions of the society as then constituted; not merely did it subsidize business but it accurately reflected the mores, morals, and myths of
the whole society. Where Gregory sounds like an economic determinist,
Holmes plays the role of cultural determinist. Before evaluating either,
however, let us see how English commentators reacted to similar developments.
Holmes v. Mather, 9 it will be recalled, adopted the rule of Brown v.
Kendall for highway accident cases, thereby creating "unique" treatment
for them as opposed to direct harm negligently inflicted elsewhere. The
English commentators, however, did, not accept the change as "politic." 60
Indeed, Winfield regarded it as an "exceptional rule" the origin of which
was "rather obscure." 61 To prove its apparent bastardy, he argued that it
must have been derived from either or both of two improper parents.
First, it may have been an application of the principle that the owner of
cattle, driving them down a road, was not liable if some of the animals
trespassed upon adjoining property unless the property owner could
prove negligence.6" This principle was hardly relevant, however, since
vehicles were not cows, and even drawing the analogy, it explained only
half of the collision cases. That is, both vehicles and cows might meander
off the highway and do damage to adjoining property owners, but cows
did not run headlong into one another on the highways. Second, and perhaps more likely, the decision in Holmes v. Mather was premised upon
some previous expressions by Lord Blackburn of a theory about the
proper allocation of the risk of loss attributable to highway accidents."
This, however, was even worse than the cow analogy because, as Winfield
pointed out, both expressions were dicta.
Rather than reflect on the possible social significance of the doctrine,
therefore, we find Winfield matching precedents and concluding that the
change was "bad law." More interesting still, the "big picture" is expressed by the judges, first by Lord Blackburn in several dicta, and then
by Baron Bramwell as the ratio decidendi for Holmes v. Mather. Hence,
Baron Bramwell concluded that: "For the convenience of mankind in
carrying on the affairs of life, people as they go along roads must expect,
59 L.R. 10 Ex. 261 (1875).
60 Holmes, supra note 54, at 89.
61 Winfield, Torts 228-29 (2d ed. 1943).
62 Goodwyn v. Cheveley, 4 H. & N. 631, 635-42, 157 Eng. Rep. 989, 991-93 (Ex. 1859).
10 Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex.265, 286-87 (1866); River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson, 2 App. Cas. 743, 767 (1877).
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or put up with, such mischief as reasonable care on the part of others
cannot avoid."64 In short, the loss of accidents will lie where it happens
to fall, albeit the axiom here takes on the coloring of an assumption of the
risk principle. Indeed, it sounds very much like assumption of the risk
when Lord Blackburn originated it, theorizing that "those who go on the
highway, or have their property adjacent to it, may well be held to do so
subject to their taking upon themselves the risk of injury .
,,65 Be
that as it may, this sounds very much like Holmes' Common Law. 6
Intriguingly, the non-highway cases were left open until 1891-and
during this intervening period one could argue that trespass lay for the
direct infliction of harm regardless of the exercise of due care. In that
year, however, Stanley v. Powel16 7 seems to have established, at the very
minimum, that inevitable accident, i.e., the exercise of due care, was a
defense in trespass. Even this was regarded by some commentators as a
departure from what they regarded as the "true" doctrine of strict liability. 8 From 1891-1959, in theory, of course, trespass continued to lie
for direct harm inflicted in non-highway case, albeit subject to the defense
of inevitable accident. Bullen and Leake continued to carry a practice
form for pleading trespass without an allegation of either intent or negligence. 9 Winfield and Goodhart wrote a law review article encouraging
the use of trespass as a gambit to shift the onus of proving due care onto
the defendant.70 The most recent edition of Salmond's hornbook insisted
that the distinction between trespass and negligence was of "great practical importance."'71 But, and this is critical, Judge Diplock discovered
that notwithstanding all of this, "in the 68 years which have passed since
Stanley v. Powell there must have been many cases where the injury to the
plaintiff was the direct consequence of the act of the defendant himself.
But no practitionerseems to have thought, and certainly no court has
decided, that to do so would affect the onus of proof.172
It seems, therefore, that in England the bar itself had come to visualize
torts as intentional or negligent wrongs: the trespass ploy was, until
64 Holmes v. Mather, L.R. 10 Ex. 261, 267 (1875).
65 Fletcher v. Rylands, supra note 63, at 286-87.
66 See notes 55-56 supra.
67 [18911 1 Q.B. 86.
68 E.g., Pollock, Torts 128-34 (Landon, 15th ed. 1951). Landon was so irate that he
labelled the author of the opinion "an undistinguished puisne judge" who obtained his
position "per stirpes and not per capita." Id. at 133; Salmond, Torts 319 n.10 (13th ed.
1961), "If the case is correct, the law on this point has taken a departure from the
earlier precedents . . . ." At 319 n.12 however, the current editor says that Landon "perhaps
goes too far" in his remarks about the judge.
69 Bullen & Leake, Precedents of Pleading (11th ed. 1959).
70 Winfield & Goodhart, supra note 36, at 359.
71 Salmond, Torts 320 (13th ed. 1961).
72 Fowler v. Lanning, [1959] 2 Weekly L.R. 241, 249 (Q.B.). [Emphasis added.]
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Fowler v. Lanning, an academic idea. The academics, in turn, were nitpicking precise precedents and were not indulging in sociological, to say
nothing of economic investigations of the law. Indeed, in the main, academic interest lay in teaching precise case handling skills rather than
indulging in sociological investigations, to say nothing of actually encouraging social engineering. In point of fact, the high point of all this may
have been reached when Professor Goodhart condemned the American
practice of collecting appellate briefs because such materials took the
students' minds off the job at hand, namely, digesting the opinions themselves. 73 Indeed, a kind of intellectual parol evidence rule operated in
English academic circles whereby the meaning of law was confined to the
opinions themselves, and extrinsic data, whether economic or sociological,
was inadmissible.74
If Americans tend to look to academic commentators to discover the
underlying import of cases, where shall we look if English academics
insist on avoiding such discourse in print? The answer, perforce, must be
to the judges themselves. And, perhaps, Lord MacMillan can come to our
aid, despite his own assertion that "Lordship's are not called on to rationalize the law of England." 5 Hence:
Whatever may have been the law of England in early times I am of opinion
that, as the law now stands an allegation of negligence is in general essential
to the relevancy of an action of reparation for personal injuries. The gradual
development of the law in the matter of civil liability is discussed and traced
with ample learning and lucidity in Holdsworth's History. .

.

. Suffice

it to say that the process of evolution has been from the principle that
every man acts at his peril ...to the principle that a man's freedom of
action is subject only to the obligation not to infringe any duty of care
which he owes to others. 76
Which, of course, is nothing more than Holmes' thesis, which, naturally
77
enough, Lord MacMillan cites.

Where are we then other than on some kind of intellectual merry-goround? We have seen, first, that Fowler v. Lanning was not decided until
more than a century after Brown v. Kendall. We have sampled academic
opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, again noting a decided difference in
flavor. Whereas American academics tend toward the "big-picture,"
English academics tend to tidy-up the cases and annotate them. 78 Still, we
73 Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decedendi of a Case," 40 Yale L.J. 161, 172 (1930),
reprinted in Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence and The Common Law 13 (1931).
74 The flavor of this can easily be obtained by comparing Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush
(1960), and Williams, Learning the Law (7th ed. 1963). See also Roberts, Book Review,
7 J. of the Soc'y of Public Teachers of Law 227 (1963).
75 Read v. J.Lyons & Co., [19461 2 All E.R. 471 (H.L.).
76 Id. at 476.
77
78

Id. at 478.

Although it was not planned to serve this purpose, the recent assault on conflict of
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have seen that, in practice, the lag evidenced by Fowler v. Lanning may
be an illusion: that is, that English lawyers were in reality acting along
lines indicated in Brown v. Kendall ages ago. If this be so, and Judge
Diplock finds that it was, then English academic writing has been most
misleading. Finally, we have seen that, whereas the crystallization of the
philosophy of torts has tended to be an academic function in America, in
England the real feel for the "big picture" may better be gleaned from the
opinions themselves. As a matter of fact, the English don's intellectual
parol rule to which we have already adverted, taken in its English context,
makes a great deal of sense.
Thus far the impression is, that whereas the English academics are
Blackstonian still, American academics are social engineers: the former
read at times like the Votaries of the canon law of some defunct theocracy,
whereas the latter reek with the hardy smell of pragmatic planners. In
practice, however, "negligence" in the two systems comes down to pretty
much the same thing. Indeed, the development of the action of negligence
has followed similar lines of evolution on both sides of the Atlantic, as a
moment's reflection will readily indicate.
The idea that negligence hinges on the reasonable man's behavior is
common to both systems. That this standard is an objective one, illustrated in Vaughan v. Menlove70 and there is no wrong if the actor
performed after the manner of the reasonable man, illustrated in Blyth
v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 0 is axiomatic in both systems. The cases
illustrating this, after all, are English decisions but are also common
teaching tools in both systems."'
Defining "duty" has had a similar history. In both systems during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the law concerned itself with
an effort to define as a matter of law the duty owed in each and every
possible contingency, such as, for example, Mr. Justice Holmes' magnificent ruling that the reasonable automobile driver should stop, look,
and listen upon meeting a railway crossing."2 The text books in both
systems began to become glutted with rules pertaining to duty until the
whole thing began to collapse under its own weight.8 3 Frustrated by this
exercise in futility, each system has tended to re-analyze duty in terms
made by P.R.H. Webb, Reader in Conflicts, University of Nottingham, and myself
well illustrate the difference in approach. Webb & Roberts, "Conflict in Conflicts," 9
L. Rev. 193 (1964).
3 Bing. N.C. 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
80 11 Exch. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856).
81 Compare Gregory & Kalven, Cases on Torts 73, 95 (1959); Street, Torts 122 (3d ed.
1963); Wright, Cases on Torts 197, 206 (2d ed. 1958).
82 Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
83 E.g., Pollack, Torts xix (1st ed. 1897); Wharton, Negligence xi-xi (2d ed. 1878).
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of "foreseeability" and each has had its Palsgraf case.8 4 Naturally enough,
once foreseeability became the test of duty, each system saw the old
privity barriers tumble and Winterbottom v. Wright buried in the debris.85
One startling difference remains in the treatment of proximate causation, which in America, at least, remains a morass. 6 In England, of course,
it is common knowledge that the concept of foreseeability has been applied to this problem as well.8 7 This particular difference may be accidental, however; that is, it is probably attributable to the demise of the
jury in England. 8 While intellectually sound and indeed inevitable,
granting the presuppositions of what constitutes negligence, 9 American
courts have continued to avoid the crystallization of the foreseeability
test into the law because, in dealing with it on an ad hoc basis, the problem thereby remains a subliminal tool with which to control juries in the
realm of fact finding.
Technically, therefore, the two systems of negligence law are compatible. Even so, the current thrust of change, inherent in each system,
has tended to split them asunder. The English, having posited duty in
terms of foreseeability, have begun to refine still further the concept of
negligence. A serious re-examination of the interests which ought to be
protected if foreseeability is the test is now underway. Thus, some years
ago, the English courts ruled that since it was foreseeable, negligent
infliction of emotional harm was actionable." More recently, still working
in terms of what a reasonable man ought to foresee, these courts have
opened the door to recovery for pure economic loss occasioned by negligence.9' Granting the fault principle, English judges are expanding the
interests subject to that principle.
In America, however, attention is not focused as much on the refinement of the fault idea as it is on the abolition of the principle in some
areas. Taking products liability as an example, the thrust has been to
84 Compare Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928); Hay v.
Young, [1943] A.C. 92 (Scot.).
85 Compare MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
M'Alister v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (Scot.).
86 E.g., Gregory, "Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreat From Rationalization,"
6 U. Chi. L. Rev. 36 (1938); Prosser, "Palsgraf Revisited," 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
See also Fleming, "Remoteness and Duty: The Control Devices in Liability In Negligence," 31 Can. B. Rev. 471 (1953); Wright, "The Law of Torts: 1923-1947," 26 Can. B.
Rev. 46 (1948).
87 Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 837 (Scot.); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd.
v. Morts Dock & Co. Eng'r (The Wagon Mound), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.).
88 Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England 65 (3d ed. 1960). Only two per cent of
civil actions are tried by jury today. See Ward v. James, The Times (London), Jan. 26,
1965, p. 16, col. 1.
89 Goodhart, "Liability and Compensation," 76 L.Q. Rev. 567 (1960).
90 Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141 (CA.).
91 Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, Ltd., [1963] 2 Weekly L.R. 101
(HL..).
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convert res ipsa loquitur from a procedural aid to a substantive rule,9 2
culminating now in the frank avowal that strict liability in tort exists in
the case of a defective product." In substance, Judge Traynor has been
proved right when he objected that "it should now be recognized that a
manufacturer incurs an absolute liability when an article that he has
placed on the market ...proves to have a defect that causes injury to
human beings.1 94 Fault may be the predominant theory still, but it is
clear that "the crest of its dominance is past. '95
A new climate of thought, therefore, abounds among American judges
and lawyers relative to the law of torts. Rather than an application of the
moral idea of "fault" to legal relations, torts is becoming a device with
which to allocate the burden for paying for losses attributable to accidents
in our urban society. It is now commonplace to observe that the trend is
toward absolute liability: "compensation," "loss distribution," and "insurance" are now predominant ideas in the law. This is not only true
in the legal periodicals,9 6 it is equally evident if one takes the trouble
97
to examine the recent trend in casebooks.
Why should the American view have changed? This change may be
due in large measure to the fact that the Supreme Court of the United
States performs political as well as legal duties. That is, we have witnessed an obvious judicial evolution whereby our Basic Law has been
steadily re-interpreted to keep it in steps with the times. Indeed, the
judges of that court appear to be not so much lawyers as judicial statesmen. By manipulating legal rules as an architect would building materials,
they are constantly engaged in a gigantic plan of social engineering with
the Basic Law. The inevitable intellectual fall-out of this particular
function, however, has been the American tendency to see all law in
terms of social engineering.
At the same time, America is a capitalist society and the concepts of
the market place loom large in its intellectual arsenal. Events are inter92 Compare Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863); Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). See Seavey, "Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in
Naufragio," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 643 (1950).
93 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963), 49 Cornell L.Q. 354 (1964). See also Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn.
543, 99 N.W.2d 670, 682 (1959) (dictum).
94 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(concurring opinion).
95 F. James, "Torts," (Practising Law Institute, American Association of Law Schools,
Significant Developments in the Law During the War Years, Series 1, No. 10, 1946).
9(3E.g., Gregory, "Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability," 37 Va. L. Rev. 359
(1951); James, "Accidental Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance,"
57 Yale L.J. 549 (1948). See also Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951); Friedmann,
"Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability," 63 Harv. L. Rev. 241 (1949)..
97 Compare the traditional format of Seavey, Keeton & Thurston, Cases on Torts (1950),
with Gregory & Kalven, Cases on Torts (1959).
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preted in terms of their effects on the market place. The fusion, therefore,
of social engineering, the offshoot of constitutional law, with the insights
of the market place, heavily scented with outright economic determinism,
has given rise to a peculiarly American outlook on the law of torts. Let us
return to Chief Judge Shaw, and look at Brown v. Kendall as seen today
by a typical American commentator:
While it is pure speculation, one of Chief Justice Shaw's motives
underlying his opinion appears to have been a desire to make risk-creating
enterprise less hazardous to investors and entrepreneurs .

.

. Judicial

subsidies of this sort to youthful enterprise removed pressure from the
pocket-books of investors and gave incipient industry a chance to experiment on low-cost operations without the risk of losing its reserve in actions
by injured employees"
This, however, is only half the story.
At the same time that social engineering and economics were combining
to form the American outlook, two other ingredients were heightening
the effect. First, stare decisis never became the force in American thinking
that it was in England. This was inevitable, perhaps, because the early
American courts set themselves to the task of modifying-i.e., changing
-the Common Law to fit its new environment. Once set in this flexible
role, the die was cast. Second, the very educational processes in America
serve to reinforce the engineering cum economics without stare decisis
Weltanschauung. In a perceptive article some years ago in the Cornell
Law Quarterly, Professor Goodhart illuminated this phenomenon:
But the American law school does not teach American law, for there is no
such law. "The national law school," Judge Pound has said, "teaches
'general legal principles' which are assumed to be uniform, although state
rules vary." The method is primarily the method of comparative law ....
The teacher must guide the student in his choice between conflicting cases,
and, in doing so, he tends to lay down a general principle himself by which
to test the cases .

. .

. The English teacher emphasizes what the judge has

said: the American professor explains what the judge should have said. 9

All of which led Professor Goodhart to conclude that the American
system was evolving away from the common law toward something more
akin to the civilian.
The culmination of all these factors can easily, if rather arbitrarily,
be isolated under the heading "policy oriented jurisprudence." That is
the precedents are not binding, economics are vital, social engineering
is the judge's function, and law is a dynamic task, the exercise of which
will lead to a better society. The question is not what is the law but what
98 Gregory, supra note 96, at 368.
99 Goodhart, "Case Law in England and America," 15 Cornell L.Q. 173, 189-90 (1930),
reprinted in Goodhart, Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law 50, 69-70 (1931).
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oughkt the law to be. The real problems are those of goals, and goals are
determined by the contemporary values of the affluent society. Those
goals, or so it would seem in this mechanical age, are to distribute the
loss attributable to accidents across the whole society by dropping fault
in favor of strict liability and shifting the quest from that for wrongdoers
to that for a risk-bearing enterprise which can, insurance-wise, spread
the risk of loss over the consuming public.
V
PROJECTION IN FUTURO

What then is the point of all this? There are several. First, the perceptive reader ought to have noted a radical difference between the early
and later sections of this article. The early sections were devoted to a
study of the precise case by case evolution of certain cases, typifying
perhaps the Common Law genre. We saw that change occurred, yet the
change was one of slow evolution within the dialectic itself wherein cases
were distinguished into oblivion obliquely rather than bludgeoned to
death by abrupt about-faces.
This approach to law reflected the mood of the era in which negligence
crystallized the fault morality of the day into the mainstream of the legal
system of the day. That morality may have been convenient for, or even
subservient to the business community, but this is irrelevant: what
matters is that it was the prevailing ethic. In short, the law in the cases
came to reflect the prevailing ethic and to channel it into an efficacious
device with which to order human conduct civilly: the judges incorporated contemporary ideas into the law of torts. The system was such,
however, that the judges had to accomplish this discretely within the
interstices of the decided cases.
The American experience roughly paralleled the English until quite
recently. The difference indicated by Brown v. Kendall was largely academic. Now, however, the American judges have begun to question the
efficacy of the fault principle. This emphasis on insurance and loss distribution may only reflect a growing new ethic in security-conscious midtwentieth century America as fault reflected the ethos of the nineteenth.
In short, the process of molding the law to reflect the contemporary
ethos is merely repeating itself.
This re-structuring of the law in terms suitable to the contemporary
cultural milieu is so all pervasive that even the "truths" of legal history
vary with the times. We have seen, for example, that Judge Diplock
doubted whether strict liability ever existed, 10 0 and, in this regard, he
100
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followed Holmes.' C. H. S. Fifoot, however, has observed that strict
liability's existence came to be doubted only when the fault principle
came into its own. In short, he suggests that the fault oriented school
saw history in terms compatible with their own conceptions of law, and
he denominated these studies as a "fascinating realm of wish-fulfillment," 0 2 Following Fifoot for a moment, we should expect that scholars
in America, shifting toward absolute liability, will reinterpret history in
terms of strict liability, rendering negligence a mere mutation. Gregory,
perforce, may be one of these.3 The truth can never be known because
it lies in the outlook, the concepts of the lawyers of a bygone era, and
not, apparently, in cases susceptible to two readings.
There is nothing very startling about this phenomenon of change: what
is worrisome is the mechanics by which the change is being accomplished.
If stare decisis is dead in America, or at least mortally wounded, the traditional brake, represented by the necessity of playing the dialectical
game, has been removed from the equation. Where the common-law
judge could gradually make adjustments, measured in decades, his American contemporary, unmindful of dialectical good taste, can change overnight. The danger here is that, whereas the common-law judge necessarily
envisioned his role as one of gradually channeling society as new ideas
developed, 104 the American judges may be tempted to create the channels
into which society must subsequently evolve.
This danger is symbolized, perhaps, by the current emphasis on
"policy": the cases ought to effectuate "good policy." But as Balzac
observed, policy has no conscience. Who then decides what constitutes
good policy? Has society generally decided that the costs of any given
product ought to contain an insurance to cover this liability? Perhaps.
If this be so, it can be effectively argued that the American courts are
creating law in the "grand style," 5 and thereby filling a vacuum left
by the legislature. Indeed, it can be argued that the English jurists can
maintain their pure negligence ideas simply because the welfare state
has provided state insurance schemes to fill this need. 6
101 Holmes, The Common Law 89 (1881).
102 Fifoot, History and Sources of the Common Law 187 (1949).
.108 See note 52 supra.
104 Compare "Law maintains order in society but cannot create it," P. Jackson, Book
Review, 27 Camb. L. Rev. 248, 249 (1964), with "There is good reason . . . to make a
conscious effort to direct the law along lines which will achieve a desirable social result,
both for the present and for the future," Prosser, Torts 14-15 (1964). There is obviously, a
subtle shading here, and a question of degree, instead of a clear-cut difference. It is, however, a real problem. E.g., Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 15 (1960). In another
context, the question is developed in Griswold, "Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart
and Judge Arnold," 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 91 (1960).
105 Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 62 (1960).
106 Friedman, supra note 96, at 258.
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Be that as it may, the question remains whether the game is worth the
candle. That is, after the need to use tort law to distribute loss has been
fulfilled, the case technique used will still remain imbedded in the judicial
veins. Will this policy-oriented law, interested more in broad generalizations than in precedent, prove to be a blessing or a curse? One thing is
certain: it is not common law. Whether this legal rationalism, as it might
better be called, is good or bad cannot be answered now, however, because
we cannot predict whether it will institutionalize some kind of brake on
its own momentum.
Further, two comments I garnered from English acquaintances might
highlight how slippery a problem this may prove in practice. To those
who feel that recent developments are too blatantly the product of unrestrained judicial legislation, a certain justice in the House of Lords
warned me that the law, in order to maintain its channeling efficacy,
had to change more rapidly in fast developing times. To those who feel
the pace too slow, an extreme left wing law don severely criticized the
emergence of policy as a value test of law, arguing that once policy
became the shibboleth of change there was no breathing space in the
gathering momentum of change during which to reflect on its direction.
But these reactions are oversimplified because they fail to draw a crucial
distinction. There is a subtle distinction we ought to bear in mind before
arriving at our own individual judgments on the law's "progress." Change
is forever with us and, witness the evolution of the common law from
Day v. Edwards to Stanley v. Powell to Fowler v. Lanning, change can
be accommodated within the common-law dialectic. Still, the common-law
institution itself, the working techniques of the judges and lawyers, is
itself subject to change. We have, therefore, to make up our minds about
two very different questions. First, whether the new trend toward strict
liability is healthy. Second, whether the trend toward a policy oriented
judicial institution is healthy. Thus, re-quizzing my two commentators,
I suspect each would answer "yes" to the first interrogatory and "no"
to the second. But then again, they are both English.
As of the moment there is no clear answer in America to the second
problem because the distinction we have just drawn is not made. Instead,
quizzing Americans, one finds a sense only of a feeling, either that the
law is changing too rapidly or not rapidly enough. The trouble is that
these answers reflect only the relative liberalism or conservatism of the
respondents relative to the social changes imminent in the law and shed
no light on the attitude toward the institutional revolution.
There is, however, one avenue that might profitably be explored by
those who would maintain in more pristine form the negligence idea.
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American negligence is ambivalent because it seeks to perform two functions. One, it is designed to regulate human conduct by enforcing the
reasonable man standard. Two, it is becoming an insurance scheme for
the benefit of victims of faulty lawnmowers, exploding bottles, medical
malpractice, vehicular accidents involving trucks owned by corporations,
and innumerable other things. The trouble is that it is questionable
whether tort law can serve two masters. Even granting that the current
development of strict liability can be made to appear compatible with
some vestiges of the fault principal, the law's expense and the law's delay
render tort lawsuits a tremendously wasteful insurance scheme.
It might make more sense in the long run, therefore, to return to
traditional concepts of negligence. Granted how far the feeling has gone
that corporate defendants ought to pay, this might necessitate eliminating
the jury in civil cases in order to restore a more disciplined perspective.
Granted, likewise, the prevailing urge to sue which is upon us,
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public might have to be disciplined by adopting a rule imposing total
costs upon the unsuccessful plaintiff. At the same time victims of accidents might be more efficiently cared for by socialized medicine, and if
crippled, maintained by welfare payments. In short, the current oblique
or subliminal drift of tort law might be made explicit. The time, however,
does not yet appear propitious. Until political thinking changes, therefore, it appears that the courts are a panacea for certain blots upon the
public welfare and are, in fact, functioning as a general haven for reform
movements.'
We have seen that order was imposed by Blackstone with his elementary direct-consequential rule appended to explain things. Order was
muddied again when new ideas of intent and negligence gained credence,
but it was restored when the fault principle was seized upon to create
a new order in Brown v. Kendall. Order in America is again muddy
because new ideas are abroad concerning the function of negligence. It
remains to be seen who will create a viable synthesis which will accommodate these new strains and afford the basis of yet another system of
order. My own reaction is that the next fifty volumes of the Cornell Law
Quarterly will be more interesting even than the first because on their
pages will be reflected the development of this new system of order.
107 The number of judges may afford some index of the volume of litigation; in England
there are twenty-one judges sitting full time hearing appeals. In New York alone, there
are thirty-four. Karlen, Appellate Courts in the United States and England 139 (1963).
108 This, quite obviously, is a paraphrase of Mr. Justice Harlan. Reynolds v. Sims, 377
US. 533 (1964) (dissenting opinion). The reader would not be far wrong to suspect that
-an analogical matrix exists involving this article and recent developments in constitutional
law.

